There is an increasing consensus that, beyond financial returns, investors should also consider the environmental and social impacts of their business activities. Major institutional investors currently are entering the realm of socially responsible investment (SRI), which incorporates environmental, It finally assesses relevant legal issues of SWFs' SRI actions. It concludes that SWFs can promote social responsibility and influence corporate governance of target companies to ensure their returns through SRI. But to be responsible investors promoting sustainability, SWFs ought to undertake SRI in line with certain legislative constraints or specific guidelines.
Introduction
Traditionally, corporations and other institutional investors seek to maximize shareholder value by using diverse investment strategies. But placing emphasis only on the short-term maximization of financial returns may lead to such problematic issues as human rights violations, corruption, and undermining of environmental protection, amongst other issues. These problems exert adverse influences not only on social and economic systems, but also on the investor per se. Therefore, with a growing number of groups and organizations advocating sustainable development, institutional investors are turning to long-term value creation and sustainability via Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) to ensure financial performance and social returns.
Another significant phenomenon affecting global financial markets in recent years is Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) investment.
1 Even though SWFs are a heterogeneous group of institutional investors that have different governance structures and legal status, they are generally regarded as public entities that act like private investors in pursuit of financial returns. 2 They are owned or managed by governments, and they invest state-owned assets in financial markets to meet macroeconomic and social objectives. As the scale and asset accumulation of SWFs have increased, concerns have arisen that these funds have the capacity to undermine financial markets and national security if they use the political power of their home countries. But, in fact, SWFs could contribute to the stability of markets and economy growth if they are well organised and well regulated. Hence, the International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds, with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have drafted a code of conduct (the "Santiago Principles") for SWFs to help reduce potential concerns and improve corporate governance.
Due to their public-private character, SWFs undoubtedly need to consider certain social returns when pursuing financial returns: they must be responsible for both their shareholders and their stakeholders.
The counterparts of SWFs, other institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds, have already adopted SRI to some extent, and regulatory regimes are in place to encourage private entities to undertake SRI. 3 Therefore, questions may emerge as to whether SWFs need to adopt SRI strategies and At the international level, many soft law regulations and internationally-recognized principles have been initiated for SRI or responsible investment. For example, the UN Principles of Responsible Investment, UN Global Compact, OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Carbon and Water Disclosure Project, Global Reporting Initiative, Freshfields report (released by the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative) and others are policy initiatives for corporations, multinationals, and institutional investors committed to conforming their corporate strategies to internationally-accepted principles and investing philosophies in the areas of environment, human rights, labour rights and other social factors. For more information about the regulation of SRI and responsible investment, please see Bryane Michael, Corporate social responsibility in international development: an overview and critique, 10 CORP. SOC. RESPONS. ENVTL MGMT. 115 (2003) ; see also Benjamin J. Richardson, Keeping Ethical Investment Ethical: Regulatory Issues for Investing for Sustainability, 87 J. BUS. ETHICS 555 (2009). At the national level, many jurisdictions include corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles in domestic regulations or policies, and the stipulations about the fiduciary duty of a company may extend beyond its shareholders and many groups have published guidance on CSR issues. For example, in the UK the Corporate Governance Code (and Turnbull Guidance) and the Companies Act 2006 require companies or directors to consider social issues. See Corporate social responsibilitythe UK Corporate Governance Code, OUT-LAW.COM, https://www.out-law.com/topics/corporate/company-law-and-corporategovernance/corporate-social-responsibility-the-uk-corporate-governance-code/ (last visited May 12, 2017). The Association of British Insurers has published CSR-related issues and SRI Guidelines highlighting ESG issues. See especially investment funds. 8 The financial market and regulatory problems revealed by the 2008 global financial crisis also have encouraged investors and policy-makers to consider long-term market development and relevant social externalities, 9 considerations that also provide some support for the SRI movement.
Generally, SRI embraces three major strategies: (1) social screening; (2) shareholder activism;
(3) community investing. 10 Socially responsible investors may adopt one strategy or combine two or more of them. The majority of investors implement SRI through social screening and shareholder activism.
Community investing is practiced mainly in the United States, 11 not in EU Member States, and will not be a focus of this article.
With social screening, investors invest in, or exclude, a particular company or sector based on its social record or ethical conduct. 12 Social screening includes two methods, negative screening (exclusion) and positive screening. Negative screening excludes or blacklists certain companies or sectors from investment based on ethical criteria. 13 Positive screening 14 involves preferentially investing in selected companies based on ESG criteria, which are often combined with the "best-in-class approach." 15 Positive screening mainly considers whether a company contributes to society or positively impacts social issues.
With shareholder activism, also known as "shareholder advocacy" or "relationship investing," 16 investors take advantage of their ownership rights to vote, engage in annual general meetings, or file shareholder resolutions, as appropriate, to promote the goal of improving corporate management and the ESG performance of a company. In other words, it aims to positively influence the conduct of a target company. Like social screening, it comprises two methods: one is active engagement, which seeks to 8 According to the US SIF (US Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment), "The total US-domiciled assets under management using SRI strategies expanded from $3.74 trillion at the start of 2012 to $6.57 trillion at the start of 2014, an increase of 76 percent." US SIF, Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends 12 (2014), http://www.ussif.org/files/publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf. 9 See Benjamin J. Richardson According to US SIF, community investing is defined as an approach that 'channels public and private investment to low income and other underserved communities in order to provide capital, credit and training that these communities would otherwise lack.' See Community Investing, US SIF, http://www.ussif.org/communityinvesting. directly influence a company's management through the use of voting rights and other shareholder rights, also known as "voice activism." 17 The other method is divestment or "exit": 18 investors divest a specific stock holding from their portfolio if a company violates ethical standards or internationally-accepted norms in areas such as human rights and environmental protection. 19 Compared to other SRI strategies, shareholder activism is a more active way to influence the corporate governance in target companies.
Shareholder activism can be used by shareholders for either social or financial purposes. 20 "Social activism" has been practiced by private institutional investors via SRI for a long time. But the engagement of sovereigns in SRI through portfolio investment is a recent phenomenon. 21 According to Ghahramani, sovereigns engage in SRI mainly based on three legislative models, one of which is ethics-based exclusion (e.g., Norway's SWF portfolio investment).
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The method of SRI advocates is to influence corporate responsibility by showing that it has financial benefits; SRI encourages companies to "do well while doing good." 23 The concept of CSR emphasises the balance between shareholder value maximization and stakeholder value maximization. Even though economists and corporate lawyers have a sceptical view of CSR, it has become a heated topic and is discussed by various groups. Rational companies may voluntarily take measures to promote CSR because it can help improve corporate reputation and attract motivated employees.
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The notion of SRI reflects the belief that "CSR and economic performance 'are not mutually exclusive but can be complementary,'" and can "mix the money with morality." 25 Apart from that, some investors use SRI strategies to influence corporate governance and thus ensure their profits in target companies.
On the other hand, some investors prefer to invest in corporate governance systems with economic sustainability under which they can positively influence corporate operation. 26 In one study, corporate executives and institutional investors believed that CSR actions could help reduce the risks from unethical events and thus lead to economic value. 27 This study suggests that companies who implement SRI or who have better shareholder involvement would be more likely to add economic value and attract capital 17 flows. 28 Therefore, the adoption of SRI seems to benefit both investors and investee entities (i.e. target companies For example, in Germany, occupational pension schemes and certified private pension schemes are required to report their investment considerations concerning social, ethical or environmental factors to the members. In Sweden, the Swedish national pension funds are required to include ethical and environmental considerations in investment policies. In Italy, pension funds are obligated to disclose non-financial factors that they consider in their investment decisions. In France, listed companies are required to publish social and environmental aspects in their annual reports according to economic regulations. In Australia, listed companies are required to make a separate annual report regarding social responsibility. 40 See Renneboog, HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 400. 41 The "code of ethics" includes the standard to promote "honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships." See Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Section 406(c)(1), codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7264(c)(1). 42 See Louche & Lydenberg, supra note 11, at 10. 43 Signatories to the U.N. Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) commit to putting responsible investment principles into practice, and the principles support the investors in incorporating these principles into their investment decision-making process. As of May 11, 2017, there are 1707 signatories of the PRI and more than 60 trillion dollars of assets under management. The six principles are as follows:
Principle 1: We will incorporate ESG issues in to investment analysis and decision-making processes. Principle 2: We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices. Principle 3: We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. Principle 4: We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry. Principle 5: We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. Principle 6: We will each report on our activities and progress toward implementing the Principles.
For more details, see The Six Principles, UN PRI, http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles (last visited May 1, 2017).
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As a corporate sustainability initiative, the UN Global Compact aims at guiding and supporting companies to act responsibly and align their strategies with universal principles on social issues and take action for a more sustainable future. For more detail, see What is UN Global Compact?, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work. 45 The total number as of May 11, 2017 is 1704, which includes 343 asset owners, 1141 investment managers, and 223 service providers. Information available at https://www.unpri.org/signatory-directory/?co¼&sta¼&sti¼&sts¼ &sa¼join &si¼join&ss¼ join&q¼ (last visited May 11, 2017 The UO theory implies that if institutional investors take social and environmental externalities into their investment strategies, they will gain financial benefit from it. 50 For universal owners, they see not only the influence of target companies on their portfolio but also the overall long-term development of the financial market. 51 It can be extrapolated that because these large institutional investors invest in a variety of assets across the economy, the social, ethical, and environmental impacts caused by target companies could threaten the economy as a whole. Therefore, these universal owners may make efforts, driven by purely financial motivation, such as exerting their shareholding rights, to directly create and ensure the financial value of their portfolio and thus indirectly promote the sustainability of the wider economy. See Hamilton et al., supra note 23, at 62. They find that "socially responsible mutual funds do not earn statistically significant excess returns and that the performance of such mutual funds is not statistically different from the performance of conventional mutual funds." Furthermore, several studies have found that there is a positive connection between social responsibility and financial performance in that social responsibility is associated with higher returns for investors (stock returns) and corporations (assets returns). 64 Indeed, several sources highlight that in the long term, the companies that take into account ESG factors and sustainable development in their strategies "significantly outperform their counterparts." 65 Among academics and researchers who track and investigate companies or industries worldwide that undertake responsible investment, it is believed to be noncontroversial that SRI has the potential to promote social and ethical norms as well as regulations at the international level. 
The need for SWFs to adopt responsible investment
In this section, we place SRI in the framework of SWF investments to discuss the need for SWFs to undertake responsible investment based on their unique position and characters.
The phenomenon of sovereign wealth funds
The rising influence of SWFs is one of the most significant developments in the international financial market over the past decade. As institutional investors, SWFs have attracted attention due to increasing size and assets invested in public and private equity. The Santiago Principles recognized the increasing influence that SWFs can exert over corporate governance practices and financial markets. also provided SWFs the opportunity to step into the global market.
The increasing assets and size of SWFs have been acknowledged above. Although compared to the total global financial assets, SWFs may constitute a relatively small proportion, they are large enough that they can influence corporate governance practices and exert a stabilising effect on the financial market.
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In fact, these large institutional investors can not only stimulate local and global economic growth and development; they also have the potential to positively impact human rights 86 and environmental situations 87 in host countries through investment activities such as responsible investment. On the other hand, for the same underlying reasons, SWF investments can also adversely affect social issues if they involve companies that violate environmental protection practices or engage in human rights abuse.
Therefore, the choice of investment policies and strategies by SWFs can result in significant influences, both good and bad, on both target corporations and the global market.
As addressed above, due to pressure to manage profitably and responsibly, many institutional investors and multinationals have adopted or begun to implement responsible investments. 88 As a consequence of this development and the development and increasing influence of SWFs, the question arises as to whether SWFs need to adopt SRI strategies.
Why SRI works for SWFs
Because each SWF has its own specific governance framework and investment strategy, it is complex to undertake a case-by-case study. More comprehensive and empirical studies are needed in future to analyse the reasons for, and results of, SRI implementation by each SWF. Such studies might show that different governance frameworks, particularly concerning political involvement, may lead to differing financial performance for SWFs. 89 Due to the limitations of current research studies, however, this paper focuses generally on possible SRI underpinnings for SWFs, regardless of individual differences. In this light, Furthermore, those SWFs that take ESG or ethical factors into account have been highly recognized by the international community because they not only seek financial returns but also improve their own corporate governance as well as that of target companies by using SRI strategies, especially shareholder activism. Empirical studies show that investments done according to SRI principles do not result in lower returns than conventional investment options.
102 Moreover, Fernandes' study finds that the majority of SWF investments do not completely control target companies, and even when largely invested in target companies, do not harm these companies. 103 He also finds that those companies in which SWFs invest, outperform and "enjoy higher valuations" due to the oversight by SWFs through their ownership rights.
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Hence, the responsible investment of SWFs does not undermine financial returns but instead, improves the reputation of their home countries. 
Existing responsible investment practices and initiatives of SWFs
In this section, we describe a range of measures and initiatives that SWFs (in selected countries) use to practice SRI and influence corporate behaviour.
Many SWFs do not have explicit guidelines or policies for practicing SRI; instead, they only mention the notion of SRI in their annual reports or state it as an investment purpose on their official websites.
Because some SWFs do not disclose any information to the public regarding their investments, it is 120 To undertake its ethical guideline, GPFG adopted the following strategies: "(i) achieve high returns subject to moderate risk; (ii) exercise the ownership rights associated with the equity holdings (done by Norges Bank); and (iii) exclude some companies from the investment universe (decided by the Ministry based on advice from Council on Ethics)." See Santiago Principles, supra note 67.
avoid investments that contribute to unethical activities and constitute unacceptable risks.
governance structure of the GPFG is clearly organized. Based on the idea that companies who respect ethical norms and principles will be beneficial to the GPFG and meet its long-term objectives, the GPFG is required to consider SRI in its operations. Thus, ethical guidelines 126 help implement responsible investment, with a view that sustainable development will benefit both the economy and society. The responsibility of the GPFG to achieve maximum profits and returns in line with sustainable development principles is laid down in these ethical guidelines, along with mechanisms to attain the given goals. One study has also argued that the ethical guidelines and SRI actions of the GPFG show that Norway is using its GPFG as a way to influence the development of transnational rules of law. 127 More specifically, because the ethical guidelines comprehend both national regulation in Norway and international regulations, the GPFG can use its shareholder power to influence CSR, determine corporate governance, and help Norway engage in international law-making processes via the financial market. SRI strategies, especially shareholder activism, are used by the GPFG to spread the notion of Norwegian government and society. 132 According to the definition of positive screening by the GPFG, positive screening or selection is an approach which selects the most ethical companies or invests in industries or companies that are aligned with responsible investment views of the investor. See Consultation Paper, supra note 129. 133 Johnsen and Gjølberg summarized their analysis that "the more active and extensive positive screening reduces the selection in such a way that one is left with a strong bias towards e.g. large-cap companies. In other words, the screening also implies that one gets a compositional bias, and thereby higher unsystematic risk." See Johnsen & Gjølberg, supra note 131. 134 See Consultation Paper, supra note 129.
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One example is gross corruption. The ZTE Corporation, a Chinese telecommunications equipment and systems company, was excluded by the Norges Bank on January 7, 2016. The GPFG tries to influence the management of target companies and force these companies to enhance their financial or social performance via shareholder activism, i.e., active management or divestment. The GPFG actively and directly engages in the operation of the target company by exercising voting and other shareholder rights to address ESG issues. In terms of active engagement, the NBIM, as the operational manager of the GPFG, uses various approaches to build knowledge about the factors that may be significant for companies' long-term profits, or meets with the representatives of companies in which it invests for discussion. 144 Moreover, the NBIM also influences the target companies via shareholder proposals, resolutions, and voting in the annual meeting. In order to improve and ensure the long-term active ownership work, the NBIM set up a Corporate Governance Advisory Board (CGAB) in 2013. 145 The Norges Bank support proxy access right when shareholders cannot exert the rights effectively concerning US companies. 
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The requirements are as follows:
The Fund shall not be invested in companies which themselves or through entities they control: a) produce weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles through their normal use b) produce tobacco c) sell weapons or military materiel to states that are subject to investment restrictions on government bonds as described in the management mandate for the Fund section 3-1(2)(c). Companies may be put under observation or be excluded if there is an unacceptable risk that the company contributes to or is responsible for: a) serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour and the worst forms of child labour b) serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict c) severe environmental damage d) gross corruption e) other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms. See Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Guidelines for observation and exclusion from the Government Pension Fund Global, Government (last updated Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fin/statens-pensjonsfond/ guidelines-for-observation-and-exclusion-14-april-2015_new.pdf. 142 For more information about the excluded companies, see NBIM Observation, supra note 125. The responsible investment framework of NZSF embraces universally recognized standards (e.g.,
Corporate Governance Guidelines, Proxy Agency voting guidelines, and the UN Global Compact) and guidelines published by the New Zealand Financial Market Authority. Due to lack of expertise in professional areas, the Guardians do not solely undertake the task of ensuring responsible investment policies. They rely on external agencies 155 to ensure that the NZSF's portfolio comports with responsible investment policy approaches.
Like GPFG, the NZSF uses negative screening to exclude companies that are directly involved in manufacture of unethical products 156 or severe breaches of responsible investment standards. The 147 See Van der Zee, In Between, supra note 37, at 20. 148 See NBIM, Work on Responsible Investment Strengthened (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/newslist/2015/work-on-responsible-investment-strengthened. 149 See Santiago Principles, supra note 67. 150 For more information about the governance of NZSF, see NZSUPERFUND, Governance, https://www.nzsuperfund.co.
nz/nz-super-fund-explained/governance (last visited May 1 2016). Companies who are directly involved in the following activities will be excluded from the portfolio:
1. the manufacture of cluster munitions 2. the manufacture or testing of nuclear explosive devices (NEDs)
Guardians of the NZSF make exclusion decisions based on international conventions, New Zealand law, Crown actions, 157 and principles in their Responsible Investment Framework, 158 as well as the target companies' activities. Because the goal of NZSF's responsible investment is to improve the behaviour of companies, exclusion is the last method used to implement responsible investment. As of December 2015, 169 companies had been excluded from the NZSF's investments, most of which are involved in the manufacture of tobacco. 159 In terms of shareholder activism, the Guardians had a deep level of active engagement with 133 companies out of the 6151 companies in its portfolio. 160 From 2014 to 2015, the NZSF participated in collaborative engagements with 119 companies and direct engagements with 14 companies. 161 Both the GPFG and the NZSF are actively engaged through their portfolios with climate change. The NZSF has divested its shareholdings from companies involved in the manufacture of tobacco and cluster munitions.
During 2015, the Guardians of the NZSF were requested or lobbied by individuals and activist groups to divest from Israeli companies 162 and companies who operate in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
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According to the responsible investment policies and guidelines of both the GPFG and the NZSF, they prefer to use shareholder activism in target companies, active engagement in particular, to promote responsible investment and positively influence the behaviour of companies. They may also use exclusion for certain circumstances and specific sectors.
The French Pension Reserve Fund
In addition to the GPFG and NZSF, the French Pension Reserve Fund (Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites -FRR) also has a legal mandate to practice SRI. The FRR was established by the Social Security Financing Act 1999 164 and it was separated from the French Old Age Solidarity Fund by Law N82001-624 in July 2001.
The FRR, although owned and funded by the government, is governed by a Supervisory Board and Executive Board.
The FRR declares itself to be a long-term investor that promotes sustainable finance. It aims to optimize long-term investment returns and to promote "balanced economic, social and environmental development." 165 The FRR contributes to the retirement plan in accordance with SRI principles, and it also promotes CSR in target companies. 166 Compared to the previously-discussed SWFs, especially the GPFG, the FRR lacks a detailed legal mandate for ethical investment, and its SRI guidelines are quite simple.
Most of its SRI measures are developed by administrative policy or interpreted by the Supervisory Board, not constrained by specific investment regulations. Its SRI principles are simply based on the U.N. Global
Compact, while its investment decision-making is mainly based on the U.N. Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI) as far as the social and environmental performance of target companies are concerned. 167 To back up its SRI actions, the FRR has developed five SRI principles followed by specified areas of concern (including human rights, job development, environment, consumer rights and corporate governance).
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Although the FRR is required to disclose its consideration of ESG factors during decision-making, it is not explicitly required to practice SRI. But its SRI initiatives demonstrate that even though the FRR lacks a legal mandate, SRI progress can be made via policy-making. To demonstrate its SRI initiatives, the FRR fondsdereserve.fr/en/socially-responsible-investment/principles (last visited May 1, 2016).
The five SRI principles include: "respect basic human and worker rights; develop job development through improving the quality of human resource management; assume responsibility for the environment; respect the consumer and fair trade practices; promote good corporate governance.' See Fonds de Reserve pour les Retraites, Socially responsible investment principles applicable to FRR awarded mandates for this approach to asset management (n.d.), http://www. fondsdereserve.fr/documents/05_5_SRI_principles_FRR.pdf (last visited May 11, 2017). this list, but detailed information about this cannot be found on FRR's website. Its selection of portfolio by the "best in class" approach is guided by its own SRI principles and the U.N. Global Compact, as well as basic standards recognized by the International Labour Organization and other international organizations. 173 The FRR also incorporates ESG criteria into investment decisions and portfolio management. It believes that the ESG factors can help its managers fully understand the risks and opportunities of target companies, which can also impact corporate value and the returns of the fund.
In terms of corporate engagement, the FRR utilises an active policy of voting proxies at annual shareholder meetings and communicating with specific target companies. In 2005, the FRR published a set of proxy voting guidelines as mandates for its asset managers. 174 Under the mandates, asset managers are obligated to vote proxies and conduct independent analyses of draft resolutions. 175 This active approach aims to improve corporate governance of target companies through active participation, longterm investment, and efforts to raise the standards of corporate governance. 176 As of December 2015, the FRR had participated in 3073 annual meetings 177 and had voted on 2131 stocks in its equity portfolio.
The resolution approval rate in its portfolio was 84.3%.
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Compared to the SRI initiatives of GPFG and NZSF, the FRR's measures have two distinguishing
features. The first one is the "social economy" approach, which emphasizes equality and democracy in economic and social development. The other is to promote transparency and report extra-financial criteria not only for itself but also for relevant companies. 179 For example, in 2006, based on extra-financial criteria, the FRR put forward a process to assess its entire portfolio.
Australia's Future Fund
The The Board operates independently from the government but is required to report the fund's performance annually to Parliament. 182 The Agency acts as the operational and administrative manager of the fund, which recommends appropriate investment strategies for the fund as well as the implementation of the strategies to the Board. 183 Compared with some of the above-mentioned SWFs, although the Future Fund has long-term financial objectives, the government has not not provided an explicit legislative mandate to practice SRI.
However, there has been some legislative attempt to impose an SRI mandate. According to the Act, the responsible Ministers give the Board written directions with regard to "maximising the return earned on the Fund over the long term, consistent with international best practice for institutional investment."
184
The government also issued directions that recommend that the Board consider ESG issues. The Board has recognized the inter-relationship between ESG issues, reputational risks, and financial return maximisation, and it therefore includes the policy of ownership rights and ESG risk management in its statement of investment policies. This statement is designed to promote SRI action by the Future Fund and increase the awareness of the importance of ESG considerations in investment decision-making and the positive relationship between sound governance and investment value. 185 It also demonstrates that social externalities and ethical risks can permeate the investment policies of SWFs. As for SRI strategies, the Future Fund generally utilises active engagement, not exclusion, to influence target companies and ensure financial value. The Board believes ESG factors enable investors and target companies to better understand risks and opportunities. The Board also recognizes that ESG factors will support financial returns maximization and have a potential impact on the performance of its portfolio. Managing these factors well will contribute to a sustainable system. Therefore, the Board and its managers use active engagement with target companies to improve the understanding of ESG issues. 
Violations of fairness and justice
The second question concerns whether SWF actions can result in violating the principles of fairness and justice. These concerns arise in particular with regard to SWF exclusion and divestment strategies. These strategies can be politically motivated; when SWFs exclude certain target companies, they do so to avoid participating in unethical activities and prevent damage to the reputation of home countries, but they do not do it to change or improve the behaviours of target companies. Since the home countries of SWFs lack legal jurisdiction over the acts of target companies in host countries, exclusions and divestment may effectively function as extra-judicial punishment in ways that violate principles of fairness and justice, especially where the home country of the target company has not accused or penalized the company.
Further, it is not generally feasible for these target companies to rebut the accusations or condemnation of the SWFs.
The techniques of exclusion through negative screening and divestment can easily be used as political tools, not legal methods. In the long term, shareholder activism through active engagement can be a better way for SWFs to improve the corporate governance of target companies and promote sustainable development.
Violation of soft law regulation
The third question concerns whether SWFs adopting SRI strategies or undertaking responsible investment could go against the soft law regulating SWFs, i.e., the Santiago Principles. Among other things, the Principles require SWFs to use investment strategies that result in moderate financial risk, to have a sound legal and governance structure, to operate transparently, and to build risk management frameworks. 197 However, the Santiago Principles do not explicitly mention responsible investment or ESG considerations.
The Santiago Principles only stipulate maximizing financial returns based on financial grounds but do not mention social returns.
Nevertheless, there are some principles that imply that considering ESG factors and implementing responsible investment strategies in investment policies are generally acceptable. Principle 19.1 stipulates that "if investment decisions are subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly disclosed."
198 This demonstrates that SWFs can adopt SRI strategies as long as they publicly disclose relevant considerations. The Santiago Principles have also recognized the value of shareholder ownership rights. As an important strategy of responsible investment, shareholder activism seems acceptable according to the Principle 21, which states "if an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investment." 199 Also, the SWF voting record should be publicly disclosed. Hence, a high level of transparency is required here for practicing SRI. Principle 22 also mentions the risk management framework of SWFs, especially reputational risk management, to avoid a decrease in financial returns and also avoid undermining the reputation of home countries. 200 This suggests that use of SRI strategies should ensure the financial value of the investment.
The Santiago Principles set conditions and limits for SWFs to undertake SRI but do not require or forbid actions. In practice, the responsible investment activities of the GPFG and the NZSF's have been acknowledged by the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), 201 the organization whose 197 See Santiago Principles, supra note 67.
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Id. members endorse the Principles, in its report. 202 Therefore, it appears SWFs could adopt SRI into their investment policies as long as they publicly disclose their SRI strategies and practices, build a wellfunctioning risk management framework, and do not jeopardize financial returns.
Political influence and accountability
The fourth question concerns the accountability of SWFs' responsible investment and political influence.
Although the political influence of the sponsor of SWFs is criticized or suspected by scholars, the major issue concerning SRI activities is the issue of accountability. There are concerns that the politics or the governance structure of SWFs may influence asset allocation decisions or change their investment strategies.
However, it can be argued that political motivations are acceptable to a certain extent when discussing SWFs adopting SRI, for at least three reasons. First, although SWFs invest for financial returns, they are established to pursue various macroeconomic or social welfare goals, and even to assume responsibility for future generations. 203 While these goals may involve political considerations, 204 SWF investment concentrating on financial returns is used to guarantee the fulfillment of social goals. The initial goal concerning social returns is set by their governments, while the operational goals during their daily transactions are based on financial considerations managed by professional external asset managers or advisors. 205 Moreover, the Santiago Principles, as best practices for SWFs, also support this argument. They illustrate that the investment policies of a SWF should be in line with designated goals set by its owner or governor based on sound management principles. 206 These policy purposes guide the asset management and investment strategy of SWFs. Furthermore, with regard to the SWFs analyzed in this article, their SRI practices are supported by their governments via legal mandate or political policy. The investment of Norwegian SWF GPFG is even regarded as an instrument helping to consolidate public value (political power) and private value (financial returns maximization) through global markets, which demonstrates the importance of public policy in private investment. 207 The GPFG uses its ownership rights to bring the public policy of Norway to target companies to produce income, and these policies in turn reflect the government regimes of both international law and Norwegian national rules. 208 As for accountability, SWFs face very limited regulatory constraints or investor scrutiny in their selection of investment strategies. The governance structure of SWFs and their level of transparency could influence or even hinder the way they practice SRI and fulfil their fiduciary duty. 209 Although some SWFs are separate from their governments, a majority of SWFs keep close ties with their governments, some of which have political leaders on the board that controls the SWF decision-making power. 
Conclusion
This paper has described the issues associated with implementation of SRI by SWFs. It has shown that international regulations, i.e., international conventions and soft law, encourage or allow SWFs to adopt SRI strategies and take ESG factors into consideration. Among existing SRI strategies, shareholder activism, active engagement in particular, can positively influence the conducts of target companies and promote CSR. It has been found that since SRI is a trend within institutional investors groups, if SWFs adopt SRI, it will reduce certain concerns from host countries and improve their reputation in the international community. In sum, implementing SRI by SWFs can make a positive impact on their financial and social returns, as well as on those of the target companies, and thus, in turn, positively affect the sustainability of financial markets.
Looking back to the beginning of this article, two important questions were put forward. The first one concerned the need to undertake SRI strategies by SWFs, and the second question concerned the way to undertake SRI strategies by SWFs. This paper has answered the first question by analysing the general underpinnings for promoting SRI and the specific underpinnings for SWFs' SRI action. It has found that adopting SRI strategies can benefit SWFs and influence the corporate behaviour of target companies. This paper has answered the second question by assessing selected examples of SWFs that have practiced SRI with or without legal mandate support, followed by examining legal issues when considering the implementation of SRI by other SWFs. This paper has found that the objective of implementing SRI by SWFs is to influence the corporate governance of target companies and thus guarantee their long-term financial returns will not be undermined by ESG externalities. To practice SRI, SWFs should act in accordance with relevant national and international rules (including the Santiago Principles) or structure reasonable investment policies or principles. 
